Courses:

• For each author, make sure you know what the main thesis of the paper is (this will be useful not only for the quote identifications).
• Make sure to prepare for the essay writing by thinking of an outline for your essay well in advance. Clarity will be much appreciated!

Two of the following will appear on the final exam.

1. Could a suitably fancy robot think? More specifically, could a robot believe that the Stata Center is on Vassar Street? (Take the robot to be constructed from the usual materials: Microprocessors, cables, servomotors, etc., with a variety of external sensors like cameras and microphones.) Could a suitably fancy robot have conscious experiences? More specifically, could a robot feel pain, or have a yellowy-orange afterimage? Approach these questions by considering how they might be answered by various philosophers we have encountered, for instance Descartes, Searle, Smart, Block, Lewis, Putnam, and Chalmers. (You are not expected to mention all of these philosophers in your answer.)
2. Nagel, Jackson, and McGinn all think that consciousness poses a problem for physicalism, on somewhat similar grounds. Critically compare and contrast their views. Is it true that "with consciousness, [the mind-body problem] seems hopeless"?
3. In "Two Conceptions of the Physical", Stoljar suggests that we are (and always will be) ignorant of facts concerning the categorical properties of fundamental physical entities, and that these unknown facts explain consciousness (or are an essential part of an explanation of consciousness). In his recent book, Ignorance and Imagination, he defends a weaker view, the "Ignorance Hypothesis." According to the Ignorance Hypothesis, we are ignorant of some physical facts that explain consciousness (or are an essential part of an explanation of consciousness). It is not built into the Ignorance Hypothesis that we always will be ignorant of these facts, nor that they concern categorical properties. Explain Stoljar's argument for his view in "Two Conceptions of the Physical". Can the Ignorance Hypothesis be defended without also defending the stronger view in "Two Conceptions..."? Why or why not? Is the Ignorance Hypothesis at all plausible?
4. In section IV of "Epiphenomenal Qualia", Jackson attempts to rebut three objections to the claim that qualia are epiphenomenal. Do any of the objections work? Does Jackson succeed in rebutting them? Are qualia epiphenomenal? Begin your answer by explaining Tye's distinction between "Qualia" and "qualia" (in "Visual Qualia..."), and how Jackson's use of "qualia" relates to Tye's two-fold sense of the term. Make sure to explain what it means to say that qualia are epiphenomenal.
   
   Please see paragraphs 2-11 ("Three reasons are standardly given…But there is no special problem for Epiphenomenalism as opposed to, say, Interactionism here.) of section IV. The bogey of epiphenomenalism in Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-36.