Courses:

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This section contains the course texts and a list of readings by session.

Many of the readings are from the four main texts:

Watson, Gary, ed. Free Will. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 019925494X.

Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, eds. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. ISBN: 0801481597.

Dennett, Daniel C. Freedom Evolves. New York, NY: Viking, 2003. ISBN: 0670031860.

Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. ISBN: 0262232227.

Of these, only the Watson, which is a recent collection of key papers, is really essential to start with. The Fischer and Ravizza provides a number of additional papers that might be interesting; but I wouldn't advise buying it straightaway unless you are very keen. The Dennett and Wegner books raise various issues about the bearing of empirical work; we'll be discussing this towards the end of the course.

In addition, a number of other books are available:

Kane, Rober, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN: 0195133366.

O'Conner, Timothy W., ed. Agents, Causes and Event: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 0195091574.

O'Conner, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN: 0195133080.

Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990. ISBN: 0195056167.

Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996. ISBN: 0195105508.

Roessler, Johannes, and Naomi Eilan, eds. Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues In Philosophy and Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 0199245622.

Course readings.

LEC #	TOPICS	READINGS
1	Introductory Session
2	The Classical Compatibilist Account	Nagel, Thomas. "Freedom." In Free Will. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651, chapter XXI.
3	Refining the Consequence Argument and "Could have done otherwise"	Watson. "Introduction." In Free Will. pp. 1-4. As much as you feel you can read of: van Inwagen, Peter. "An Argument for Incompatibilism." In Free Will. Notes on Modal Logic and Counterfactuals (see lecture notes)
4	Denying Closure of Unavoidability	Slote, Michael. "Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem." Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982).
5	Lewis on Law Breaking	Lewis, David. "Are we free to break the laws?" In Free Will. For background on this have a look at: ———. "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow." Noûs 13 (1979): 455-76.
6	Modal Metaphysics	Stalnaker, Robert. "Possible Worlds." Nous 10, no. 1 (March 1976): 65-75. Additional Reading Rosen, Gideon. "Modal Fictionalism." Mind, New Series, 99, no. 395 (July 1990): 327-354.
7	More Modal Metaphysics	Lewis's footnote on impossible worlds: Lewis, David K. Footnote 3 in On the Plurality of Worlds. New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1986, p. 7. ISBN: 0631139931.
8	Libertarianism I	Clarke, Randolph. "Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will." Noûs 27, no. 2 (1993): 191-203.
9	Libertarianism II	Kane, Robert. "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (1989): 219-254.
10	Time Travel	Heinlein, Robert. "By His Bootstraps." Astounding Science Fiction (October 1941). Under pseudonym Anson MacDonald. Reprinted in The Menace From Earth. New York, NY: Baen Books, 1999 (1959). ISBN: 0671578022. Lewis, David. "The Paradoxes of Time Travel." American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 145-52.
11	Frankfurt on Alternate Possibilities	Frankfurt, Harry. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839. Locke, John. "Anticipation of Frankfurt" In Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book II, 1689, chapter XXI, section 10.
12	Reactions to Frankfurt
13	Strawson	Strawson, Peter. "Freedom and Resentment." In Free Will.
14	Reactions to Strawson	Watson, Gary. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme." In Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Wolf, Susan. "The Importance of Freewill." Mind, New Series, 90 (1981).
15	Frankfurt's Higher Order Account	Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971).
16	Reactions to Frankfurt	Watson, Gary. "Free Action and Free Will." Mind, New Series, 96 (1987).
17	Reason Responsiveness; Wolf	Wolf, Susan. "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility." In Free Will.
18	Choosing; Intentions; Weakness of Will	Holton, Richard. "Intention and Weakness of Will." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-62.
19	Choice and Freedom
20	Choice and Knowledge	Velleman, David. "Freedom." Chapter 5 in Practical Reflection. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 1989. ISBN: 0691073376.
21	Empirical Work: Social Psychology I	Wegner, Daniel M., and Thalia Wheatley. "Apparent Mental Causation." American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 480-492. Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Especially chapters 1-3.
22	Empirical Work: Social Psychology II	Dancy, Jonathan. "Arguments From Illusion." Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 181 (October 1995). Byrne, Alex. "Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts." Philosophical Studies 86, no. 2 (May 1997): 103-129.
23	Addiction	Yaffe, Gideon. "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2002). Robinson, Terry E., and Kent C. Berridge. "Addiction." Annual Review of Psychology 54 (2003): 25-53. Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. "The Mind of an Addicted Brain." Current Directions in Psychological Science 4/3 (1995). Watson, Gary. "Excusing Addiction." Law and Philosophy 3, no. 4 (1999): 351-365.