Courses:

Innovations have frequently determined the course of wars. This seminar has three purposes. One, it inquires into the causes of military innovation by examining a number of the most outstanding historical cases. Two, it views military innovations through the lens of organization theory to develop generalizations about the innovation process within militaries. Three, it uses the empirical study of military innovations as a way to examine the strength and credibility of hypotheses that organization theorists have generated about innovation in non-military organizations.

Both the theoretical literature on innovation and the case literature on military innovation are of an uneven quality. We have selected theoretical literature largely on the basis of its accessibility to the general reader and the clarity and explicitness of the arguments. This course is not a substitute for a survey course in organization theory although it can profitably be taken by people without such a background. We have taken a broad approach to the selection of cases. Some of the innovations we will study concern the development and adoption of particular technologies; others involve changes in doctrine, tactics, command and control, and force structure. Some of the innovations have occurred in peacetime; others have only been achieved after the outbreak of combat. Some innovations seem to conform to hypotheses in the organization theory literature; others are more mysterious. Security studies specialists will find the study of these innovations a useful way to improve their general understanding of modern warfare.

Grading for this course is based on the following distribution: