| REC # | TOPICS | CONTENTS |
|---|---|---|
| I. Labor Market Statistics: Data Sources and Historical Overview | ||
| II. The Neoclassical Labor Supply Model | ||
| 1 | Measurement Error (PDF) | Deriving the Slutsky Equation Using Roy's Identity Measurement Error Notation Classical Measurement Error Group Means as Proxy Variables Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data Cures for Classical Measurement Error "Non-Classical" Measurement Error |
| 2 | Maximum Likelihood (PDF) | Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) MLE Examples Bernoulli Distribution Normal Linear Regression The Probit Model |
| 3 | Panel Data (PDF) | Estimation With Panel Data Basic Setup First Differences Fixed Effects Random Effects Measurement Issues Non-Classical EIV: Division Bias Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data One Solution to EIV: Wald IV |
| III. Labor Demand, Immigration, Minimum Wages, and Unions | ||
| 4 | Instrumental Variables (PDF) | Grouped Data and Instrumental Variables How Does OLS Work? Group Means as Proxy Variables Main Types of Bias in OLS Grouped-Data IV Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 2SLS as a Grouped Data IV Potential Problems: Weak Instruments, Many Instruments Discussion of the Replication of Angrist OLS Regressions Fixed-Effects Regressions 2SLS Estimates The Card Critique |
| 5 | Instrumental Variables (cont.) (PDF) | Instrumental Variables (continued) Omitted Variables and the Wald Estimator 2SLS as a Grouped Data IV Heterogeneous Treatment Effects A Few Hints About Calculations With Scalars in Stata |
| 6 | Random Coefficient Models (PDF) | Random Coefficient Models Motivation Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Example: General Exam 2003, Question 1 |
| IV. Human Capital, Education, and Training | ||
| 7 | Educational Choice (PDF) | Educational Choice The Discount Rate Bias Story A Simple Model for Signaling Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium in Signaling Games Separating Equilibrium Pooling Equilibrium |
| 8 | Bargaining and Hold-Up (PDF) | Motivation Bargaining The Strategic Approach The Axiomatic Approach Interlude: Efficient Bargaining With Inefficient Outcomes? The Hold-Up Problem - Investment in Physical Capital |
| V. Labor Demand and Related Topics | ||
| 9 | Labor Demand (PDF) | Market Power and "Classical" Labor Demand Estimating Market Power The Conduct Parameter The Corts Critique |
| VI. Turnover, Matching, Learning, and the Returns to Tenure | ||
| 10 | Normal Learning Model (PDF) | Statistical Learning The Normal Learning Model The Jovanovic Example The Holmström (1982) Career Concerns Model |
| 11 | Models of Turnover (PDF) | Models of Turnover and Their Empirical Predictions Motivation Matching and On-The-Job Search - Deconstructing Jovanovic II Dynamic Decisions, Convexity, and Option Values Option Values in Continuous Time |