| LEC # | TOPICS | DESCRIPTIONS | KEY DATES |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. Games of Complete Information | |||
| 1 | Normal Form Games I | This session covers dominant strategies, pure strategies, mixed strategies, and Nash equilibrium. Examples include the prisoners' dilemma, battle of the sexes, matching pennies, and chicken. | |
| 2 | Normal Form Games II | This session covers continuous strategy spaces. Examples include the duopoly, and spatial electoral competition. | Problem set 1 due five days after lecture 2 |
| 3 | Normal Form Games III | This session covers more than two players. Examples include "truel," oligopoly, and tragedy of the commons. | Problem set 2 due |
| 4 | Normal Form Games IV | Examples include rent-seeking, lobbying, and resource allocation. | Problem set 3 due |
| 5 | Extensive Form Games I | This session covers backwards induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium. Examples include the centipede game, the Stackelberg duopoly, and legislative rules. | Problem set 4 due |
| 6 | Extensive Form Games II | Examples include 2-player sequential bargaining, and bargaining in legislatures. | Problem set 5 due three days after lecture 6 |
| 7 | Extensive Form Games III | Examples include sophisticated voting and agenda control. | Problem set 6 due |
| 8 | Repeated Games | Examples include the development of cooperation, and overlapping generations. | Problem set 7 due |
| II. Games of Incomplete Information | |||
| 9 | Normal Form Games | This session covers Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Examples include the battle of the sexes again, auctions, and the revelation principle. | Problem set 8 due |
| 10 | Extensive Form Games I | This session covers perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Examples include signaling games and nuclear deterrence. | Problem set 9 due |
| 11 | Extensive Form Games II | Examples include cheap talk and the informational role of committees. | Problem set 10 due |
| 12 | Extensive Form Games III | Examples include the reputations. | Problem set 11 due |